Reply to Easton and Lang Comment on Section 337 - Pricing Jurisdiction of the United States International Trade Commission by Kaye, Harvey & Plaia, Paul
Maryland Journal of International Law
Volume 3 | Issue 2 Article 6
Reply to Easton and Lang Comment on Section




Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mjil
Part of the International Law Commons, and the International Trade Commons
This Notes & Comments is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Maryland Journal of International Law by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more information, please contact
smccarty@law.umaryland.edu.
Recommended Citation
Harvey Kaye, & Paul Plaia, Reply to Easton and Lang Comment on Section 337 - Pricing Jurisdiction of the United States International Trade
Commission, 3 Md. J. Int'l L. 382 (1978).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mjil/vol3/iss2/6
A REPLY TO EASTON AND LANG COMMENT ON
SECTION 337 PRICING JURISDICTION
OF THE U.S. INTERNATIONAL
TRADE COMMISSION
Harvey Kaye* and Paul Plaia**
These authors' find it difficult to reply to the comments of
Messrs. Easton and Lang2 because:
(1) they attribute to the present authors position which these
authors have not taken; and
(2) whenever these authors attempt to provide historical
information for use in analysis of section 337,3 they assume this is
tantamount to agreement or acceptance of it.
A reading of these authors' earlier article on section 337
jurisdiction demonstrates that the article presents historical and
factual information along with judicial pronouncements in
various areas of unfair acts, unfair methods of competition and
restraints or monopolization of trade and commerce. This is
offered so that the discussions currently being conducted by those
in the international trade field can be based on more information
than was previously available and, hopefully, arrive at reasonable
decisions and conclusions.
* Member of the District of Columbia and Virginia bars; partner, Spencer &
Kaye, Washington, D.C.
** Member of the District of Columbia and Maryland bars; Kensington,
Maryland.
1. "These authors" throughout this reply will refer to Harvey Kaye and Paul
Plaia, Jr. Messrs. Kaye and Plaia have authored many articles in this area, most
"recently Revitalization of Unfair Trade Causes In The Importation of Goods, 57 J.
PAT. OT. Soc'y 208 (1975); Tariff Act Section 337 Revisited: A Review of
Developments Since The Amendments of 1975, 59 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 3 (1977); and
the article to which Messrs. Easton and Lang wrote their comment, The
Relationship of Countervailing Duty and Antidumping Law to Section 337
Jurisdiction of the U.S. International Trade Commission, 2 INT. TRADE L. J. 1
(1977).
2. Edward R. Easton and Jeffrey M. Lang are Attorney-Advisers in the Office
of the General Counsel, U.S. International Trade Commission. This reply refers to
their comment entitled A Comment: Kaye and Plaia on Section 337 - Pricing
Jurisdiction, published in this issue of the International Trade Law Journal, at p.
XX supra.
3. 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1975).
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A REPLY TO COMMENT ON SECTION 337
I. CONCURRENT JURISDICTION
Easton and Lang attribute to the present authors a position
advocating a refusal of jurisdiction in matters of unfair pricing.
While concluding this, they fail to identify and define what they
mean by "unfair pricing." To characterize the Kaye and Plaia
position in these terms greatly misinterprets and understates the
position presented. If unfair pricing by the Easton and Lang
definition includes violations under the Antidumping Act, 1921, 4 a
careful reading of these authors' position shows that what is
advocated is not a refusal of jurisdiction, but rather a suggestion
that the Commission, under certain circumstances, suspend its
proceedings pending the outcome of the Treasury dumping
investigation under section 337(b)(1). The suggested suspension
would only be undertaken when predatory intent is not a part of
the allegations before the Commission. As pointed out, should the
Treasury take action in a purely dumping situation, i.e., price
discrimination without intent to injure competition, there would
be no basis for jurisdiction under section 337. This is made clear
through these authors' explanation of what are considered unfair
acts and unfair methods of competition under the statute.
Easton and Lang find that the statute "was ordered to
establish any and all types of standards for commercial conduct
in the import trade of the United States, including pricing policy."
There is no basis for this position since the substantive unfair
competition (subject matter) jurisdiction under the statute was not
changed by the 1974 amendments to section 337. The thrust of
their statement appears to be that the ITC should take part in
determining U.S. international trade policy and use section 337 to
accomplish this end. The purpose of section 337 is to interpret
fairness; an important point which Easton and Lang do not
address is that commercial fairness requires that foreigners be
held to the same standards as domestic firms. Indeed, this is what
section 337 is intended to accomplish. The Senate, in its report on
the Trade Act of 19745 made it clear that the substantive
jurisdiction under section 337 was not changed by the 1974
4. 19 U.S.C. §§ 160 (1970), et seq.
5. S. REP. No. 93-1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 194 (1974). The legislative history
of the section 337 Amendments states with reference to the Commission's
jurisdiction: "No change has been made in the substance of the jurisdiction
conferred under section 337(a) with respect to unfair methods of competition or
unfair acts in the import trade.
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amendments. While Easton and Lang discuss the mandatory
nature of the Commission's statutory responsibility, this does not
upset nor contradict the position of these authors concerning
Commission action on unfair pricing complaints.
II. THE ROBINSON-PATMAN AcT
Easton and Lang appear to have pronounced the Robinson-
Patman Act as repealed without the requisite legislative act.
These authors have suggested that the need to examine predatory
pricing arises out of the Commission's recognition that unfair
competition and antitrust law violations, including section 3 of
the Robinson-Patman Act, section 1 or 2 of the Sherman Act, and
section 5 of the FTC Act are within the coverage of conduct
prohibited under section 337. The Robinson-Patman Act is not
used as a model, but must be reckoned with since it defines one
type of unfair act. It is necessary to examine intent when
considering pricing violations whether that intent be viewed from
the standpoint of the Robinson-Patman Act or the Sherman Act.
These authors discuss predatory pricing and review the current
and past applications of the law in the area; nowhere do these
authors adopt or align themselves with any of the specific
methods or findings within that body of law.
What these authors have suggested is that there is a body of
law which should be examined as a prelude for Commission
action on the alternatives available.6 Very simply, what these
authors conclude is that predatory or unfair pricing is distin-
guished from violations under the Antidumping Act, 1921, by the
existence or non-existence of intent to injure competition. For the
purpose of these authors' analysis, it was not necessary to go
further than to point out that the ITC has determined that
violations of the unfair competition and antitrust laws of the
6. See Kaye and Plaia, The Relationship of Countervailing Duty and
Antidumping Law to Section 337 Jurisdiction of the U.S. International Trade
Commission, 2 INT. TRADE L.J. at 9, where the suggestion was made that "In order
properly to analyze the problem, the history of the pertinent statutes should be
examined. Therefore, a description of present practice and a review of the history
of (1) non-patent section 337 allegations, (2) countervailing duty law, (3)
antidumping law, and (4) the law of predatory pricing are presented.... " It is the
body of law encompassed by these areas which should be examined by the
Commission prior to its following one of the alternatives open to it. The
alternatives themselves were discussed in this article from pages 64-77.
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United States are a basis for violations under section 337 of the
Tariff Act of 1930, as amended.7
Whether or not past Robinson-Patman decisions provide a
good or bad standard was not within the scope of these authors'
article. Various sections of the FTC Act and the Robinson-Patman
Act have been previously used as guides for defining unfair acts
and unfair methods of competition.8 To the extent that these
statutes and the decisions analyzing them have been used as
guides they must be considered under section 337. The reason for
this is clear when one considers the Easton and Lang point that
the ITC develop thorough market analyses of the impact of unfair
pricing. This should not be done unless it has been done in the
past so that there is some judicial precedent for it.
These authors discuss the Robinson-Patman Act because
there have been cases dealing with unfair pricing under the Act
and it would be irresponsible for the Commission to ignore
precedents in the area of fairness in trade and pricing.
In discussing the Above-Ground Swimming Pool case,9
Easton and Lang state that the ITC, in adopting a portion of the
recommended determination, found that section 2 does not reach
discriminations in price between import transactions in the
United States and other transactions that occurred wholly in
other countries. It is important to note that this statement was
based upon a court determination under the Robinson-Patman
Act, the same type of court decision which they suggest the ITC
should ignore. It should also be noted that these authors suggest
that prior Robinson-Patman decisions should be approached with
caution as indicated by the citation of the Department of Justice
study concerning the Robinson-Patman Act.
III. EXPORT SUBSIDIES
The third point of the Easton and Lang comment unequivo-
cally finds the real issue in price competition to be the definition
7. 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1970).
8. For cases in which various sections of the FIC and Robinson-Patman Acts
have been used as guides for defining these terms, see Federal Trade Commission
v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643 (1931); Federal Trade Commission v. Cement
Institute, 333 U.S. 683 (1948); In Re Orion Co., 71 F.2d 458 (1934). For a discussion,
see also Kaye and Plaia, Tariff Act Section 337 Revisited, 59 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 3
(1977).
9. Commission Opinion, In the Matter of Certain Above-Ground Swimming
Pools, Investigation Docket No. 337-TA-25.
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of trade distorting subsidies. This position, however, does nothing
to resolve section 337 jurisdictional problems. They fail to address
the conclusion of these authors (and of the Commission) that a
countervailing duty-type situation may be a relevant fact when
investigating a larger scheme of predatory pricing. Their
statement concerning countervailing duties does not expand,
define or contradict either the position of these authors concerning
the place of countervailing duty in Commission jurisdiction, or
their review of the state of countervailing duty law as a factual
matter. The "real issue" examined by these authors is the
jurisdictional bounds and limits of section 337 in the unfair
pricing area. Comments concerning actions which this country or
the Congress may take concerning the elimination of grants and
subsidies, while interesting, do little to resolve the current
jurisdictional problem.
Easton and Lang suggest that the ITC become involved in the
current multilateral trade negotiations. However, this is not a
proper arena for the ITC since it is independent and non-political.
The Commission's statutory duties are to make objective studies
for the President and for Congress when requested and under
section 337 to engage in regulatory activity. As a regulatory
agency the Commission should not be involved in a diplomatic
and political matter such as the multilateral trade negotiations.
IV. CONCLUSION
Insofar as the future is concerned these authors believe that
during the multilateral trade negotiations, the potentially harass-
ing effect of multiple actions on factually related matters under
different statutes will be discussed, including a section 337
investigation on predatory pricing currently with a dumping
investigation. The readiest solution to this problem, and one
which does not emasculate any of the current statutes and still
preserves the philosophy that foreign business entities are to be
held accountable for their unfair acts in trade and commerce just
as domestic firms are, is to transfer the consideration of less than
fair value determinations in dumping proceedings to the U.S.
International Trade Commission.
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